

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 6115

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E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 16, 1973

( (SALT TWO - 360)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF NOVEMBER 16, 1973.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
NOVEMBER 16, 1973

MR. MINISTER:

SALT TWO HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR AND WE NOW  
HAVE A BRIEF RECESS BEFORE US. TODAY'S MEETING IS THEREFORE AN  
APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO REVIEW OUR WORK AND TO CONSIDER WHERE WE  
STAND IN OUR SEARCH FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE US DELEGATION CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE US PROPOSALS  
OF LAST MAY REPRESENT A REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE APPROACH TO OUR  
TASK, CONSISTENT IN ALL RESPECTS WITH THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING  
THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED BETWEEN OUR TWO  
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GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. THESE PROPOSALS RECOGNIZE  
THE EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES WITH NO UNILATERAL  
ADVANTAGE AND, BY ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, WOULD IN  
FACT IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. UNDER THESE PROPOSALS

EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE AN AGGREGATE OF 2350 ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS -- A REALISTIC LEVEL TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADAPT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ITS CURRENT DEPLOYMENT. WITHIN THIS AGGREGATE CEILING, SUBSTITUTION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND FOR EACH OTHER, WOULD BE PERMITTED. THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND ON AGGREGATE ICBM THROW-WEIGHT WITH APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE US SIDE HAS SET FORTH THE REASONS WHY IT BELIEVES THROW-WEIGHT TO BE AN OBJECTIVE MEASURE (FIGURE OF MERIT) SUITABLY RELATED TO THE USEFUL CAPABILITY OF ICBM BOOSTERS AND THUS TO THEIR DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL.

IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN OTHER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND A SPECIFIC PROGRAM FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES FROM THE INITIALLY AGREED LEVELS.

THE US DELEGATION ON NOVEMBER 13 SET FORTH THE REASONS WHY ITS PROPOSAL REGARDING RECIPROCAL ASSURANCES TO THE EFFECT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS NOT LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THE ONLY FEASIBLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO PROPOSED A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT FREEZING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS FOR ICBMS. IF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT CONTAINS LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS AT LEAST AS ADEQUATE AS THOSE WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR PRECISE EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE MISSILES WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED FROM THOSE LAUNCHERS.

WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES BELONGING TO THIRD COUNTRIES, WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ONCE AGAIN REFERRED TO ITS UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF MAY 17 AND MAY 26, SECRET

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1972. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT MRV/MIRVS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CONSIDERING LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET MRV/MIRVS. THE US VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMS OF THIRD COUNTRIES IS WELL-KNOWN TO THE SOVIET SIDE. IT IS THAT SUCH ARMS ARE NOT A SUBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE US, ON MAY 24 AND MAY 26, 1972, STATED THAT IT DOES NOT ACCEPT THE VALIDITY OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF MAY 17 AND MAY 26. THE US POSITION ON THIS MATTER HAS NOT CHANGED.

ON OCTOBER 9, THE SOVIET DELEGATION TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS SOVIET DRAFT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A LARGE DISPARITY IN THE

NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND IN THE ICBM THROW-WEIGHT WHICH THE SIDES COULD HAVE FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. IT WOULD GIVE ONE SIDE A LARGE ADVANTAGE IN SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILES SUBMARINES. IT WOULD SEVERELY DEGRADE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ONE SIDE'S STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE BY PLACING SEVERE CONSTRAINTS ON BOMBER ARMAMENTS WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR LIMITATIONS ON AIR DEFENSES. IT WOULD FORCE CANCELLATION OF THE NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE AND HEAVY BOMBER PROGRAMS OF ONE SIDE WITHOUT CONSTRAINING THE BROAD RANGE OF ACTIVE NEW STRATEGIC PROGRAMS OF THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING FOUR NEW ICBMS, AT LEAST THREE OF WHICH ARE BEING TESTED WITH MIRVS. IT WOULD WORK BASIC AND ASYMMETRICAL CHANGES IN REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCES BY REQUIRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS DEPLOYED AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE DEFENSIVE FORCES WHICH SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCES, WHILE LEAVING UNCHANGED THE FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE SOVIET DRAFT INCLUDES A PROVISION LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON ICBMS AND SLBMS TO AN "AGREED PORTION" OF THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF SUCH MISSILES PERMITTED TO EACH SIDE. UNDER SUCH A FORMULATION, ONE SIDE COULD TRANSLATE ITS ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC MISSILE LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND IN ICBM THROW-WEIGHT INTO A MANY-FOLD ADVANTAGE IN THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES.

IT IS ALSO NOT CLEAR HOW THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD BE TRANSLATED INTO SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH WOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION,  
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IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS" SIGNED IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE, 1973 PROVIDE THAT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. A JOINT EFFORT IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT COMPLY WITH THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT REGARDING VERIFIABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

MR. MINISTER, IN SUM, OUR EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TEXT AGAINST THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE HAS FOUND IT DISAPPOINTING IN ITS ONESIDEDNESS. IT IS THEREFORE THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 9, 1973 HAS NOT ADVANCED THE NEGOTIATIONS AND DOES NOT PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR PROGRESS.

MR. MINISTER, I LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING IN THE NEAR FUTURE OUR COMMON LABORS TO FULFILL THE GUIDANCE GIVEN US BY OUR HIGHEST AUTHORITIES.  
JOHNSON

SECRET

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